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ABSTRACT 
Huntsville, Alabama, represents the heart and soul of the American drive 
to become a space-faring nation. It is also a symbol of our dedication to making 
this an international effort open to the participation of all mankind. It has come 
to its important role out of dreams in  the United States, in Germany, and in a 
number of other countries. Although Huntsville now has impressive facilities 
for developing and testing the free world's largest launch vehicles, more than 
anything else, it has a team of people working in partnership who have combined 
their dreams with great engineering practicality and thoroughness, and with 
unmatched persistence in  efforts extending over many years. We have certainly 
come a long way down the development road, and yet we  know this is still a 
pioneering effort, with the best yet to come. 
It is my purpose to discuss some aspects of the efforts of another great  
team to achieve practical space flight, and to compare that development with our 
own. Even with the secrecy which surrounds much of that effort, essentially the 
same basic technology drawn from a common world heritage is being employed. 
What  we are doing to achieve space flight is wel l  worth doing on its own 
merits. But all of us would be less than human if w e  were not curious about the 
approaches and the results of another strong team in a similar effort. And I 
think we all share a desire that we be first in space both as a personal challenge 
and because it has inescapable implications for the well-being of our Nation. 
NASA - GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
Dr .  Charles S. Sheldon has  been a particularly astute scholar of the 
activities and accomplishments of the USSR. 
the Professional Staff of the National Aeronautics and Space Council in the 
Executive Office of the President, has an extremely rich and diversified past. 
He was born in China. 
and Harvard. He spent some time at  the Naval Intelligence School, par t  of the 
Postgraduate School of the Navy, at California Technical Institute'and at the 
Guided Missi le  School in  For t  Bliss. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and 
Pan Xenia, the international foreign trade honorary. 
Dr.  Sheldon, who is a member of 
He received his schooling at the University of Washington 
D r .  Sheldon's major field is economics. His experience includes such 
a long list that it would take a good deal of time to cover it thoroughly. 
mention a few highlights: He w a s  a trade analyst of the Por t  of Seattle Com- 
mission, he was in the department of economics at the University of Washington, 
a consultant of the Sabena Belgian World Airlines, and the director of the 
Institute of Maritime Commerce and Transportation. These are a few of his 
many activities. His military experience includes being a waterfront officer 
at  the Naval Supply Depot in Oakland, and staff member of Naval Intelligence 
School in Anacostia. 
To 
A t  present, Dr. Sheldon is a Captain of the United States Naval Reserve, 
with 23 years  of service. Other Federal service includes Chief of the Pacific 
Section of the Cargo Requirements Division, W a r  Shipping Administration, staff 
economist of the Joint Economic Committee of the U. S. Congress and then, very 
importantly, the assistant director and later technical director of the Committee 
on Science and Astronautics in the House of Representatives; and since 1961, 
member of the professional staff of The National Aeronautics and Space Council, 
Executive Office of the President. Publications that Dr. Sheldon has authored 
a re  equally impressive and cover an equally long list. Among them are Inter- 
national A i r  Transportation, The Japanese Shipping Industry, The National 
Space Program, Space Handbook, Next Ten Years in Space, The First Soviet 
Moon Rocket, Military Astronautics, Manned Spaceflight in the Context of 
National Goals, and most recently, The Challenge of International Competition, 
and Overall Economic Outlook in Space in the Fiscal Year 2001. He has been 
associated with two early space programs. One w a s  the Argus Project and the 
other the Vela Hotel Project. Both of them included military concepts of radia- 
tion, artificial radiation in space. 
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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM X- 53518 
THE SOVIET CHALLLNGE IN SPACE 
SUMMARY 
Huntsville, Alabama, represents the heart and soul of the American drive 
to become a space-faring nation. It is also a symbol of our dedication to making 
this an international effort open to the participation of all mankind. It has come 
to its important role out of dreams in  the United States, in  Germany, and in a 
number of other countries. Although Huntsville m w  has impressive facilities for 
developing and testing the free world's largest  launch vehicles, more than anything 
else, it has a team of people working in partnership who have combined their 
dreams with great engineering practicality and thoroughness, and with unmatched 
persistence in efforts extending over many years. We have certainly come a 
long way down the development road, and yet we know this is still a pioneering 
effort, with the best yet to come. 
It is my purpose to discuss some aspects of the efforts of another grea t  
team to achieve practical space flight, and to compare that development with 
our own. Even with the secrecy which surrounds much of that effort, essentially 
the same basic technology drawn from a common world heritage is being em- 
ployed. 
What we are doing to achieve space flight is well  worth doing on its own 
meri ts .  But all of us  would be less than human if we were not curious about 
the approaches and the results of another strong team in a similar effort. And 
I think we all share  a desire that we be first in space both as a personal challenge 
and because it has inescapable implications for the well-being of our Nation. 
INTRODUCTION 
I would like to say just  a word about the Space Council, which is where 
I work. The Space Council w a s  created at the same time a s  NASA, but as a 
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separate organization attached to the White House. Under the present version of 
the law it is chaired by the Vice President of the United States, and the other 
four  members a r e  the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Administrator of NASA, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. 
It is concerned with high level policy. NASA is only one of our clients. The 
Department of Defense, another major operator in space, is equally involved 
in  the work of the Council. Our purpose is to do several different things when 
requested by the President: Namely, to keep track of what is going on both at 
home and abroad in  space; to lay out a program for the United States at the 
Presidential level; [ The details in the NASA case, of course, come from within 
NASA itself. ] to make sure  that these program elements are assigned among 
agencies; to arrange cooperation among agencies; and to settle disputes. We 
have a small staff headed by an Executive Secretary of subcabinet rank, Dr. 
Edward C. Welsh, and there are seven of us who are on his staff as profes- 
sionals. 
gram. 
This means that w e  are spread pretty thin over the total national pro- 
We have about 150 industrial briefings a year in our office, and we 
occasionally have to testify before Congress in the executive sessions. 
try to keep track generally of what is going on. In spite of all the things w e  have 
to do as a staff function, w e  are not as burdened as many people in NASA are 
with operating functions, so w e  occasionally have some time to think about the 
deeper, more philosophical side of space. Where are w e  going? What does it 
all mean? Wha t  are our problems of competition? A s  an  outcome of some of 
these questions I got started into more detailed work of comparing the United 
States and Soviet programs. 
quite a bit about the Soviet programs, but those who pursue it in depth usually 
have to work behind the wal l s  of security and they have not faced the problem of 
trying to sort  out those things which can be said in the open. I have had the ad- 
vantage and privilege of doing that and I have found that it is possible to build a 
fairly comprehensive record, although it may not agree in  every respect with the 
best information available to Government. I am reasonably confident, however, 
that it is not misleading in itk general import as to the nature of the Soviet pro- 
gram and its  relative status with our own. 
We do 
There are many people within Government who know 
So, based upon this public record of facts, I would like to make some 
comparisons and give something of a sketch of the Soviet program. There are 
many kinds of open records, and by now a substantial volume has been built up. 
The Russians themselves have released some information on their  program. 
More is contained in the Goddard Satellite Situation Report, which gives orbital 
elements of spacecraft. Hindsight is a wonderful tool which makes it possible 
to keep going back and re-reading what has been said earlier, and in  the light of 
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what has happened, many of the earlier things now make more sense. My own 
unclassified records in the office contain over 16 000 pages of Soviet published 
material on space translated to English. A couple of summers ago I made a 
conscious effort to re-read this record and to make some statistical analyses of 
what the Russians had said both as to what  they had done and w h a t  they had pre- 
dicted for the future. This review has helped to prepare this unclassified account. 
QUANTITATIVE TRENDS AND COMPARISONS 
The Soviet program still reflects its early start, its orderly nature in 
planning and content, its vigorous pursuit, its strongly competitive nature, and 
the fact that like our own it seeks multiple though interlocking goals. 
There is no simple answer to who is ahead in the space race, and I hope 
that very few people are guilty of trying to answer that question in any very 
superficial way . 
I am not going to disclose very many statistics as they are burdensome, 
but some are necessary. Even those in the space business lose track of how f a r  
and how f a s t  we have been going. Overall, the United States has had 306 suc- 
cessful orbital or escape launchings and the Soviet Union 153 including Proton 
UI. In number of spacecraft, including multiple launches, the United States 
Department of Defense has put up 290 earth orbiting payloads. NASA has put 
103 into earth orbit  and sent 14 more to the moon o r  planets. The Russians 
have put 174 into earth orbit, and sent 17 more on escape missions. This 
means that in number of successful flights of payloads to earth orbit or  escape, 
the ratio is 2.1 to 1 in our favor. 
This does not tell the whole story. I have made counts based upon 
several different methods of calculation, but whatever basis I take for these 
estimates, the Soviet lead in total weight of payload has held consistently six or 
seven years. There was  one brief period when you might argue that Project 
Score i n  1958 gave us a lead temporarily. But however one measures it, whether 
one tries to find out what true payload w a s ,  o r  whether  one normalizes every- 
thing to a standard launch capacity to low orbit, the result is essentially the 
same. The Soviet lead has been growing larger every year. Even now that the 
Saturn and Titan III flights have come along, we have not yet begun to close the 
gap. This is something that is not emphasized in the newspapers, but it is not 
a classified statement either. 
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There is another comparison which is possible to develop from the 
record. Though this draws indirectly upon classified information, it has been 
certified safe to release because it doesn't give the details. The Soviet com- 
mitment to escape missions, flights to the moon and planets, a s  a relative 
share of total launch effort, successes and failures combined, has been 3 . 2  
times as great as the US effort. They have made a fa r  greater  effort in relative 
terms at these escape missions than has the United States. 
a greater effort in absolute terms in number of flights and a still greater effort 
in the terms of the weight of payload commited to escape missions. 
They have also made 
A s  far as the record of successes and failures goes, this is also drawn 
indirectly from classified sources which have been certified safe to summarize, 
there is really very little difference between the two countries. Both countries 
have been learning by doing. Considering just  the launch and flight part  of our 
space missions, our ratio is up to 92 percent successes this year. Overall, 
from 1957 to 1966, it is running a t  better than three quarters, and that includes 
the early days when things were a lot tougher in terms of chances of success. 
The Soviet figures are  so close to ours that i f  it were possible to go over them 
in detail, one would note no significant statistical differences between the two 
countries. It means that although the Russians hide their failures as much as 
they can, they a re  basically working wi th  the same problems that NASA is. 
This, I assume, is no surprise. 
QUALITATIVE MAKEUP AND COMPARISONS 
It is difficult to make a very detailed comparison of the two countries 
that will  satisfy everyone because there a r e  secrecy policies in both countries, 
and there are different emphases, philosophies, and priorities that involve value 
judgments between the two programs. It is rather interesting, incidentally, to 
hear Soviet reactions. It has happened to other people and it has happened to 
me on Radio Moscow that if we make any claim of our successes, the Russians 
say we "boastedf? about this. If w e  credit them with anything, then we have been 
"forced to admit. So we either "boast" about our program o r  we a r e  "forced 
to admit" things about their program. But in spite of the way propaganda 
occasionally misuses this information, and the frailities we all possess,  I am 
trying to arrive at the fairest balance between the two programs because I think 
it is important to our understanding neither to overestimate nor to underestimate 
the people on the other side. 
In general, almost every part  of our  broad space program has a Soviet 
counterpart. I cannot find anything that we a re  doing or  planning in realistic 
terms for  future missions that does not have some kind of a parallel in the 
Soviet program. 
SCIENTIFIC SATELLITES 
Some people claim that the Soviet program is purely military, and they 
also say that w e  have been tricked into a race to go to the moon while the Russians 
are concentrating on near earth military space. That is not necessarily true. 
They pursue science as well. Going back to some of the beginnings, you may 
recaii ii was ssmething of a shock to us  when Sputnik III went up back in 1958. 
We would have to rate it as an WW in  terms sf i ts general capabilities, with a 
large number of experiments on board and about 3 000 pounds of payload. This 
operated very well for two years until it burned on reentry. 
The Russians don't go in  just for spectaculars. In the Kosmos series, 
they have had flights that are most nearly like our own Explorers. There have 
been 30 of these so far. All  go out of Kapustin Yar ,  a small  base near the 
Volga River. 
varied as our space program, but the times of day of launch and the kinds of 
orbits as to eccentricity vary quite a bit. 
know precisely what the weights are, but measurements of their brightness and 
the fact that they are probably spin stabilized and a few other things suggest 
that they may be somewhere between 300 and i 000 pounds each. 
They all fly at a 49 degree inclination so it is not nearly as 
These are not recoverable. We don't 
They have had a few other satellites in their scientific program. The 
Elektrons have gone up in  pairs, one of each pair going to 4 000 miles apogee 
and the other to 40 000 miles. The experiments described don't aceount for all 
the weights and the solar cell arrays, and some think that there a re  other ex- 
periments that have not been identified, something other than just the radiation 
and particle measurements advertised. And then, of course, there is the Proton 
series,  three of which now have been orbited. They ca r ry  cosmic ray experi- 
ments measuring energies all the way up to 100 trillion electron volts. These 
ships weigh 26 903 pounds, which makes them a pretty good size by any standard. 
In terms of all of the things that the Russians have done and published I 
think w e  can say that our program in science is stronger than the Soviet program, 
that w e  have done better perhaps at interpreting the results that have come back. 
But at the same time, the Soviet effort in scientific satellites is a large one. 
Unmanned Lunar and Planetary Flights 
This is very curious effort and illustrates well  the difficulties of trying 
to make a direct  comparison of how the two countries stand. In this area their 
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commitment has been relatively, and in absolute terms, as I said, larger than 
our own. Their payloads have been far heavier. Some of them have been more 
complex, some have been less. But what has been most startling is their per- 
sistence in the face of many failures in this area. The lunar program in par- 
ticular has had many difficulties. For a long time, there wasn't much to show 
in results, after the success of Luna I11 back in 1959, which took some rather 
low-grade pictures of the far side of the moon; nonetheless it w a s  an interesting 
tour de force to get those pictures home as they did. Their program on soft 
landings began in January 1963, and we can establish this from completely un- 
classified sources in the public record. Only recently did the Russians finally 
admit that many of these flights were failures. They had the failure in January 
of 1963, and Luna IV, V, VI, VII, and VI1 all failed as par t  of this program. 
Kosmos ti0 was really a lunar failure as part of this program. Luna IX did make 
a landing but has since been outdone in the technique that we have used for the 
landing and the kind of results which have come back from Surveyor. Kosmos 
111 was a lunar failure, and their Luna X then went into lunar orbit. Our hopes 
are that when w e  match that particular thing, we will outdo it in actual re- 
sults to be obtained. 
The planetary program is especially striking. The Russians have 
allowed no planetary window for M a r s  o r  Venus to go unused without multiple 
attempts since 1960. The first two 
did not get to earth orbit and those a r e  the only two such orbital flight failures 
that the United States Government has ever announced to the public. In general, 
our policy, for reasons of security I suppose, has been not to disclose Soviet 
failures, but this  time w e  did so. They had the two M a r s  attempts in 1960, two 
Venus attempts in 1961, three Venus attempts and three Mars  attempts in 1962, 
two more Venus attempts and a M a r s  attempt in 1964, and a late M a r s  launch 
and three more Venus attempts in 1965. So all of these add up to 17. Inci- 
dentally the last M a r s  attempt did not get off within the window and it followed 
later then, in 1965, as Zond 111 which w a s  programmed to take pictures of the 
far side of the moon again and then to continue as if  it w e r e  on its way to M a r s  
and to send these pictures back over ever-greater distances. What is curious 
is that of all the attempts the Russians have made a t  the planets, the one which 
seems to have performed as i t  should w a s  Zond 111, which wasn't going much of 
any place and particularly not toward any planet. But one of these times that 
program undoubtedly is going to work. It is also interesting that the commit- 
ment of hardware, the weight of payload, to their planetary program has been 
15 times as great as our own, so this represents a very considerable investment 
and a real determination to keep working in  this field. 
There now have been 17 flight attempts. 
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Applications Satellites 
There is no doubt whatsoever that we have held a marked lead in this 
field because our  priority w a s  such that we put an early emphasis upon practical 
results in communications, in weather satellite flights, in navigation, in 
geodesy, and so forth. The Soviet ability to do applications probably is there, 
but they have been slower to set the priorities. Now some of these priorities 
hive apparently been rearranged and they are beginning to do some things. 
Nobody can take the credit away from u s  for 'mi% ths first m d  then having had 
second generation very practical craft which do very excellent jobs in. these 
areas. Looking first at the weather side, the two countries have agreed to ex- 
change weather data over the "coldline, '' but the Russians have yet  to deliver 
satellite pictures. However, development is underway, and the Russians have 
revealed that Kosmos 45, Kosmos 65, and Kosmos 92 were all satellites carry- 
ing advanced weather sensors on board and taking pictures, and that they were 
successfully recovered after flight. They have also, as you know from relatively 
current news, released pictures taken by a Molniya satellite from near syn- 
chronous altitudes to give a view of the weather patterns over the whole Eurasian 
land mass. When it comes to communications, of course, it is now our Early 
Bird that floats in a fixed position relative to the surface of the earth over the 
Atlantic and is available 24 hours a day. The Russians launched something they 
call Kosmos 41 which went into elongated orbit, highly eccentric, with its 
apogee over the northern hemisphere. 
I am glad I had already gone on public record as saying that it w a s  a communi- 
cations failure. Perhaps i t  was,  and perhaps it wasn't, but then came the 
Molniya flights of which there have been three announced, and these have gone 
into the same kind of orbit. It makes a certain amount of sense from the Soviet 
point of view. An elongated orbit is easier to achieve than a t rue synchronous 
orbit and yet i t  does a very good job with the 12-hour orbit positioned so that 
every day one of its apogees comes over the Eurasian land mass  and the pay- 
load is available for 8 or 9 hours at a stretch without interruption for joint use 
by ground stations in places like Moscow and Vladivostok, and of course it has 
also been used for color television programs between Moscow and Pa r i s  in 
both directions . 
They did not announce its full  purpose. 
In the navigation area, we have something w e  called Transit, though 
that name has disappeared from the public record. We do say that we put up 
navigation satellites and have an operational system. Premier  Kosygin an- 
nounced that navigation w a s  one of the three application programs which the 
Russians actually had flying a t  that time. He said weather, communications, 
and navigation were the three kinds, and if  one would try to guess what were 
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the Soviet navigation satellites, my own candidate would be another par t  of the 
Kosmos program, those that have gone up in multiple launches. Some of them 
go up as many as five at a time, 10 in one month. There are 24 of these that 
have been orbited. 
up and they are all inclined at 56 degrees to the equator. Precisely how they 
are used and whether they have other uses such as in communications is one 
of those things which has not been revealed. But the fact that there has been no 
talk about it suggests to me that there is probably a military navigation system. 
Also, by coincidence, two of these Soviet satellites have radio isotropic power 
supplies on board and the only programs where we have used such power in this 
country happen to be in our navigation satellites. I hope I am not being led too 
much by this coincidence into a false conclusion about these flights. 
I 
They are in relatively circular orbits several hundred miles 
I 8 
Military Space 
The United States and the Soviet Union have pledged and declared that 
they wi l l  not orbit weapons of mass destruction. However, more recently the 
Russians have paraded in Moscow some vehicles that they describe as orbital 
weapons and that are in their  inventory. The United States has no such pro- 
gram. The majority opinion in official c i rc les  in this country is that it just  
does not make sense in regard to the problems of maintenance, command and 
control, and all the r e s t  of it, as compared with ICBM's in silos o r  having 
missiles on Polaris submarines at sea. But whatever the possibilities are, 
both countries have limited insurance available in an  antisatellite system. 
Quite aside from weapons in orbit, there are many other thipgs that 
These a r e  passive in are possible in military support operations in space. 
nature and exploit the right of free passage which has been exercised ever  
since Sputnik I flew over much of the world. 
Union claim that their activities in space are peaceful, and certainly in the sense 
of helping to maintain the peace, ours  are consistent with our  declarations in the 
Space Act. The activities of the Department of Defense are no less peaceful 
than those of NASA because that is our national policy. NASA has no monopoly 
on peaceful activities here. And of course when it comes to charging others 
with less than peaceful intentions, it is a thing that a third country would find 
harder to judge in a way which would satisfy everyone. What is aggressive may 
be more of a state of mind than a matter of the kinds of hardware which are in  
orbit. So far a s  the satellite is concerned, data gathered and transmitted are 
a very impersonal kind of thing. We certainly know that our  own country does 
not have aggressive intentions in space. Once upon a time all the potential 
missions of a military nature in space were discussed fairly freely. Now it 
Both the United States and Soviet 
seems to be national policy t~ play this in rather a low key way except that we 
do conscientiously report every flight to the United Nations with an orbital ele- 
ments report. Also we report our  failures, and w e  report  our debris. 
Russians tend to be rather sanctimonious about their activities and extremely 
evasive about what  they are doing with some of their flights. 
payload successes and all of them a r e  labeled as being scientific in nature. 
The 
They only report 
They have made their Kosmos label a cover for many kinds of activities. 
For one thing, we know from the time of launch and the behavior of some of the 
%sxr,es flights that they are a cover for lunar and planetary escape missions 
which have failed to leave ear th  orbit. There is nothing classified a h i t  this 
declaration. It is just in the nature of things. This w a s  also officially acknowl- 
edged by Mr.  Webb back in 1962 on September I, when he reported some instances 
of Soviet failures. A t  that point the Russians had not begun to label these things 
as Kosmos. A s  a matter of fact, they went through a brief period not mentioning 
these partial failures at all. 
name them but not disclose their purpose and thus escape the blame for operating 
with that particular kind of secrecy. 
They learned from experience that it is better to 
I have already suggested that some of these Kosmos satellites, those 
at 56 degrees inclination, could very well be for navigation, they could also be 
for communications; indeed, they may have several missions. But even more 
interesting is one large group of Kosmos flights which fly mostly at 65 degrees 
inclination, a few at 51 or 52 degrees, and a few at 72 o r  73 degrees. Back in 
May of 1960 came the first of the craft they called satellite spaceships. These 
w e r e  the original precursors  to the Vostoks, and many of them carried dogs. 
We learned to recognize them, how they flew, from their brightness, that they 
were stabilized, and that they had quite a flow of telemetry out of them. 
Then came the Kosmos series and it w a s  announced as  something which 
came from several different launch sites within the USSR. We quickly identified 
from quite simple open sources, as other countries did too, that at first these 
were coming from Kapustin Yar.  But the fourth one came from Tyuratam, the 
largest  Soviet launch base, the only base which up to that time had been used for 
ICBM testings. Kapustin Yar  is an intermediate range missile base normally. 
The fourth Kosmos had all the observable characteristics of the Vostoks and 
flew at a 65 degree inclination with low circular orbit. It w a s  announced as 
recovered after about three days and since that time there have been more 
which are similar, some 52 flights of this nature. 
It is very hard, particularly since there have been very few results 
announced from them, to imagine any mission f o r  52 heavy payloads in the 
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10 000 pound class and up, which now routinely stay up for  just eight days. They 
come down before the carrier rocket so it is a pretty good sign that they are 
called down, and they fly these repetitive low orbits and are spaced about two 
a month, roughly, and rarely overlap, with one exception. Their only mission 
that I can think of is that they are picture-takers, and I am helped by the fact 
that Premier  Khrushchev, when he w a s  still in  office, offered on two occasions 
to trade pictures of military bases taken by satellites. The Soviet Government 
officially has not acknowledged such flights. Incidentally, Khrushchev also 
suggested a t  one time that it would be far better for us to watch Cuba by satellite 
than fly the U-2 over it and risk having the U-2 shot down by the Soviet surface 
to air missiles. A t  the very least, Khrushchev's words pull the rug out from 
earlier Soviet charges that such activities only happen in  Western countries 
and are highly provocative and dangerous. 
Manned Space Flights 
This has been one of the a reas  of strong Soviet effort and it is one where 
the assessment has had to change within the last year  because of our own very 
great progress in this country. But just look at some of the earlier history of 
this. Before Gagarin went into orbit, the Russians had a hundred orbits of con- 
trolled flight experience with the Vostok craf t  and they used at least six dogs. 
When we  sent John Glenn up, w e  had taken as many precautions as  w e  could. 
We had only three orbits experience with the Mercury system including the 
use of one ape. 
way back to 1957 with Sputnik I1 when Laika w a s  up and alive for  at least a 
week. The Vostok craft, as you recall, w a s  over 10 000 pounds and as they 
have moved on to the Voskhod, the weight has moved up; the second one w a s  
12 520 pounds as reported by the Russians at Paris to the FAI. In the early 
days you wi l l  recall we had some unpleasant comparisons to face in terms of 
amount of orbital time, but that balance has  swung very markedly now in our 
favor with the long duration achieved in the Gemini flights. 
Vostok and Voskhod systems, which a r e  similar to each other, plus those un- 
manned Kosmos flights, which have all the appearance of being the same basic 
hardware, have now passed the 7 000-orbit level of experience of successful 
flight which should give the Russians a pretty high degree of confidence in the 
system. The fact that w e  have done so well in the past year  o r  so of course 
is very, very encouraging. The thing which is so surprising to all of us  who 
follow these matters is that the Russians have not demonstrated successful, 
sustained rendezvous station keeping, docking, and the kind of maneuver in 
orbit  with manned craft that w e  now have seen accomplished in this country. 
The Russians have had biological data from orbit  going all the 
However, the basic 
Why haven't they? I personally suspect that they are skipping the Gemini stage. 
The Voskhod w a s  not as much an upgrading over Vostok as Gemini w a s  over 
Mercury. I suspect that they are going on to their own equivalent of Apollo, 
and this accounts for the long gap. It is the kind of gap w e  would have had in 
this country if we had moved from Mercury to Apollo. W e  decided on Gemini 
as an interim step and I hope in net balance it supports Apollo. 
Comparative Rocket Thrust 
This clearly has been an area whers the Riussians have had an advantage 
for a long time. They went on a different path from u s  to some extent. I know 
that the people like Dr. von Braun and others at Marshall must feel very 
poignantly the decision in the early days to go the Vanguard route first of all 
and to keep i t  entirely separate from our military effort and to do satellite 
work with a marginal rocket. The Russians from the outset decided to use 
military hardware and took their early ICBM, which had been designed before 
the thermonuclear breakthrough came along, so that their standard launch ve- 
hicle ever  since the early Sputnik has been something that w a s  roughly the equiva- 
lent of a larger Titan II in  its lift capacity. In the first three flights it did not 
have a proper upper stage on it so that a fairly large ca r r i e r  rocket went into 
orbit, somewhat like Project Score. Since that time they have added an upper 
stage they used for their early luna r  flights, and the pictures released are 
clearly the same pictures that have come along with the Vostok. So they have 
used this same communication for  manned flights putting up over 10 000 pounds 
in ear th  orbit; and with the better upper stage now they are able to put an 
announced 14 000 pounds into low earth orbit to serve as a launch platform for 
escape missions. So this now is a pretty familiar vehicle to them. They have 
announced and filed at Paris a report that the combined thrust of all stages of 
the Vostok class launch vehicle is I. 32 million pounds of thrust. They also 
told us ,  for what it's worth, and we have played with these figures for  a long 
time, that i t  has a total power output of about 20 million horsepower. 
Coming down to the more recent events, they have the Proton class  
vehicle. This is the one that has been used for 27 000-pound payloads. They 
have not told us what the thrust is, but they have told us  that the total power 
output is over 60 million horsepower. Therefore, we  have concluded that the 
first stage thrust is probably somewhere between 2 . 5  and 3 million pounds. 
We also are quite sure that we have not seen an optimal upper stage on it. It 
probably has a lift capacity when an existing upper stage is put on it of some- 
where between 40 and 60 thousand pounds to relatively low circular earth orbit. 
So probably, it is ahead of the uprated Saturn once it gets that staging. On the 
I1 
other hand, for the moment the United States, with the effort of Marshall, may 
hold the lifting record with 58 537 pounds. The announced Soviet record is 
almost 27 000 pounds for the payload and an unstated weight for the accompany- 
ing but separated ca r r i e r  rocket in orbit. 
That means in a sense that w e  are almost running neck and neck, although 
I think the United States does have some advantages. We are using high energy 
propellants and doing it very successfully, particularly with the experience 
with AS 203, and we don't have this kind of indication yet on the Soviet side. 
M r .  Webb has  suggested that the two countries are running at a very parallel 
level. He thinks, as you have heard in his recent statements, that the Russians 
a r e  going to tend to beat us by a little bit in time and a little bit in weight on 
these steps, but until it happens of course we don't know for sure .  He suggests 
that the Proton class is not the end of the Soviet line any more than the uprated 
Saturn is the end of the line for the United States. In the next year o r  so as our 
Saturn V comes out w e  wi l l  have to see whether there is a Soviet equivalent and 
how big it is. In terms of the operational use, they have had the competitive 
advantage since 1957 up to this point, of a vehicle basically with a lot  of ex- 
perience which can put up to 14 000 pounds in orbit  as against our most com- 
mon rockets that were smaller,  and only recently have we added rockets that 
are quite a bit bigger than the basic Soviet vehicle. Of course we  haven't had 
as many flights yet wi th  these new vehicles, but the country owes Marshall a 
tremendous debt of gratitude for the success and quality that has come, the un- 
blemished records on these flights. 
COMPARATIVE SPACE GOALS 
What about the goals of the two countries? I really don't find too much 
difference bebeen  the announced goals of the two  countries. I do find, from 
my review of all those thousands of pages in my files that I have collected over 
more than ten years,  that the Russians, at every level from the project engineer 
up to the very highest level of their government, and consistently over all of 
these years,  have set very ambitious goals. 
table, although increasingly they say they are going to beat u s  to the moon if 
they can, and that their goal is to put Soviet man throughout the entire solar  
system -- a very ambitious goal. They look forward ultimately to colonization 
of the planets by Soviet man. In the short run they have capitalized upon head- 
lines and prestige; they have opened up new scientific frontiers;  they have been 
gaining' military information. Now they are moving ahead to more complex 
missions with further practical applications, and they are also paying grea t  
These are without an exact time 
attention to the technological spin-off of space. It really doesn't sound very 
different from many par ts  of our own program. F o r  the next period beyond 
that I am sure  that they are trying to build a versatile, economical space 
transport capability that can open up the solar system. 
The Moon Race 
What  about the race to the moon? I believe that that is language which 
isn't dways  helpful, but nonetheless the public is going to tend to view it as 
something of a race. Both countries clearly are tryirig t~ bii.i!d t: brnd capa- 
bility to operate in space. Going to the moon is a technological bench mark, 
a way of organizing resources with a time table, a way of winning public 
support. It is not necessarily an end in itself. For  a period some people 
thought the Russians were not in this competition o r  w e r e  not trying to go on 
the same time scale, and they love to quote, as the New York Times did, an 
occasion when Khrushchev was asked about this in Denmark and said in effect 
"Well, w e  have no plans to go at this time. We will watch wha t  the Americans 
do with great interest. We wi l l  profit by their experience. 
of headlines in this country to the effect that the Russians were out of the "race. l 1  
It w a s  only a few weeks later when a group of visiting American businessmen 
called on Khrushchev and he threw one of his temper tantrums and shouted 
that it w a s  the lying American press misquoting him. He had never said the 
Russians were  not going to the moon, that they w e r e  working hard on this 
problem. Incidentally, this second Khrushchev report did not get the same 
press  attention in our country, which is regrettable. 
cessful lunar  flights of this year, the Russians have been more positive in 
saying that they do plan to get to the moon before 1970 and the cosmonauts in 
recent days have said that when w e  Americans land on the moon w e  will  be 
greeted by Soviet cosmonauts. That may be just bravado, since they are 
cosmonauts. If that is not official Soviet policy, they still get the propaganda 
benefits, and i f  it is not t rue,  the Soviet Government is not held responsible. 
A s  you know, our own President has said that Americans wi l l  not only get there 
before 1970 but wi l l  be the f i r s t  ones to arrive. Somebody is going to be right 
and someone wrong with regard to such predictions when the f i rs t  landing comes 
about. Although I think we have a good chance, we know how good our program 
is, and there are many uncertainties still about the Soviet program; it would be 
highly dangerous for us to assume that they are not trying and trying very hard. 
This made lots 
Of course, with the suc- 
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CONCLUSIONS 
W e  still live in an  age when there are some people who act as though 
space flight were not here to stay, that we are near the limits of what is possible 
in terms of cost and reliabilities and SO forth. Some of these people with such 
conservative views even have technical and scientific training. The history of 
technology and science has been filled with past examples, particularly in my 
own field of transportation economics, of something of a cultural lag with 
people balking at w h a t  w a s  coming. 
understands what is coming, that we are on the way to becoming wha t  President 
Kennedy once labeled a space-faring nation. I think that in and out of Congress 
there are enough key Americans who understand this, so that w e  wi l l  continue 
to push space. It is something important. Russians also feel this way about it. 
But fortunately the younger generation 
The knowledge to do well  in space is not the monopoly of any one country 
or  even any two countries. It is something that grows out of a universal heritage 
of all mankind, and I think in the years ahead as costs come down, even with 
the great backlog of experience which w e  have in this country, there will be 
others who will enter this business rather competitively. W e  do face a strong 
Soviet challenge which is immediate. If they were to disappear I hope it would 
not change the pace of our program. W e  do have to recognize Soviet rivalry 
as one of the political realities. The challenge is one which I feel involves far 
more than prestige. It is one which can be rewarding to us  materially and can 
be useful to mankind in promoting the peace, and in making human beings feel 
that they have a truly significant role in the universe. 
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